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Fisher v. Lee
215 F.3d 438 (4th Cir. 2000)
LFacts
On April 2, 1992, Willie Ervin Fisher ("Fisher") broke into the home
of his girlfriend, Angela Johnson ("Johnson"), broke her cheek and jaw, and
stabbed her approximately thirty-two times. During the attack, he also
stabbed her fourteen-year-old daughter, Shemika, in the arm. The police
arrived and Shemika and Johnson were taken to the emergency room.
Johnson was pronounced dead as a result of her stab wounds at 7:30 a.m.'
Later that afternoon Fisher turned himself in to Winston-Salem police,
waived his Miranda rights, and made voluntary statements concerning the
murder. At trial, Fisher pursued a voluntary intoxication defense by
asserting that his alcohol and crack cocaine use prevented him from forming
the specific intent necessary to be convicted of first degree murder. Fisher
claimed to have "blacked out" during the actual stabbing.2
The jury convicted Fisher of first degree murder on the basis of malice,
premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. He was
also convicted of burglary and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury. At the sentencing hearing the jury found that the offense
was committed during the commission of a burglary and that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.4 The jury also found the pres-
ence of several mitigating circumstances, including that Fisher was under
the influence of mental or emotional disturbance during the commission of
the capital felony.' However, none of the jurors found that Fisher's capac-
ity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law was impaired.' Fisher received a sentence of
death, fifteen years for burglary, and three years for the assault.7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the conviction and
sentence and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.' Fisher
1. Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 441-42 (4th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 443. Fisher contended that he was unaware of his actions between the time
that Johnson attempted to take the knife from him and the moment a shotgun, fired by a
neighbor, was discharged. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. SS 15A-2000(e)(5), (e)(9) (1999).
5. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 444; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(f)(2) (1999).
6. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 444; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(f)(6) (1999).
7. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 444.
8. Id.; see Fisher v. North Carolina, 513 U.S. 1098 (1995) (mem.).
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filed a motion for appropriate relief in Forsyth County Superior Court.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on claims that had not been proce-
durally defaulted and ultimately denied each of them. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina denied certiorari. Fisher then filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. The writ was denied.9 On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Fisher raised the
following two claims for habeas relief: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective
during the guilt and sentencing phases;'0 and (2) that the state trial court's
instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was
unconstitutionally vague."
IL Holding
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Fisher failed to make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right, denied his request for a
certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal."
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Ineffective Assistance Claims
Fisher first contended that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
introduce additional evidence in support of his voluntary intoxication
defense, both at trial and at sentencing, in order to support the mitigating
factors. 3 While this case was tried in North Carolina, the mitigating
circumstances in that state are the same as the statutory mitigators in
Virginia. In particular, Fisher asserted that there was additional evidence to
support his claim that (1) he committed the crime while under the influence
of mental disturbance ("(f)(2) factor"), and (2) that his capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of the law
9. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 444.
10. Id. at 444-55.
11. Id. at 455-59.
12. Id. at 459.
13. Id. at 448. Prior to reaching Fisher's substantive ineffective assistance claims, the
court briefly dismissed Fisher's assertion that these claims were not adjudicated on the merits
in state court and thus, the deferential standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) was
not applicable. Id. at 445; see Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No.
104-132, S 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (Supp.
IMI 1997)). In particular, Fisher complained (1) that the state court did not carefully consider
his motion for appropriate relief, (2)the order contained erroneous factual findings, and (3)
that the state court's order was so summary in niture that it overlooked his claims of
ineffective assistance. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 445-46. The Fourth Circuit determined that the state
court did adjudicate on the merits, thus a deferential standard of review under S 2254(d) was
appropriate. Id. The court next looked to identify the "dearly established Federal law"




was impaired ((f)(6) factor).,14 Fisher claimed that counsel should have
presented the testimony of several lay witnesses that Fisher was drinking
during the afternoon and evening." Fisher also claimed that additional
experts should have testified to support both the defense of voluntary
intoxication and the mitigators, as well as a statement made by Johnson
after Fisher's first attack.'
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the evidence produced at trial to support
the voluntary intoxication defense and the two mitigators. 17 The court
found that the testimony of Cliff Foster, a friend of Fisher's who used crack
cocaine with him in the hours preceding the murder, and Dr. Hoover, a
psychiatrist, constituted sufficient evidence to support a jury instruction on
voluntary intoxication at the conclusion of the guilt phase, and to support
the submission of numerous statutory mitigators, including the (f)(2) and
(0(6) factors, during sentencing." The court reviewed Fisher's ineffective
assistance claims under the two prong analysis set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 9 and were satisfied that Fisher's counsel's presentation of lay
testimony, expert testimony and other evidence in support of Fisher's
voluntary intoxication defense and the (0(2) and (0(6) mitigators, was not
deficient.2" The court also determined that there was no reasonable proba-
bility that absent the alleged errors, the jury would have ruled differently."
14. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 445-46; see SS 15A-2000(0(2), (f)(6).
15. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 448.
16. Id. Two corollary claims, that trial counsel failed to have the defense expert offer
an opinion as to Fisher's ability to adjust to incarceration, and that Johnson said that Fisher
was acting out of character, were summarily dismissed by the court. Id. at 452-53. The court
determined that based on the cumulative mitigating evidence, counsel's performance did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 453. The court further stated that
there was no reasonable probability that, absent the alleged errors, the jury would have
decided not to impose a death sentence. Id.
17. Id. at 448-49.
18. Id. at 451. Fisher contended that more lay persons should have testified about
Fisher's alcohol consumption during the afternoon and early evening in order to bolster his
voluntary intoxication defense. Id. at 449. He also contended that Dr. Hoover failed to
testify in the exact words of North Carolina General Statute S 15A-2000(f)(6) that Fisher's
"capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct [and] to conform his conduct to law
was impaired" by his alcohol and drug use. Id. at 451; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(f)(6).
The court dismissed these contentions because Foster testified about their crack cocaine use
and Dr. Hoover thrice offered the opinion that Fisher was in an alcohol and drug induced
black-out state when he committed the murder and so was incapable of forming a plan to
murder Johnson. Id. at 449-50.
19. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
20. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 453; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(holding that a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel may be made if (1) counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing profes-
sional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different).
21. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 453-54. The Fourth Circuit also summarily dismissed Fisher's
2000]
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B. Instruction on the "Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel"
Aggravating Circumstance
Fisher also contended that the trial court's instruction on the "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance was unconstitu-
tionally vague.' Because Fisher did not raise the constitutionality of this
issue in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the state
court reviewing his motion for appropriate relief ruled that the claim was
defaulted.23 The Fourth Circuit found that on habeas review the court is
precluded from reviewing the merits of a claim that was procedurally
defaulted under an "independent and adequate" state procedural rule,
"unless the defendant can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice."24
In particular, Fisher asserted that the statute cannot operate as an
independent and adequate state law ground for procedural default because
the Supreme Court of North Carolina was required to conduct an "auto-
matic review" of his death sentence which would have included this claim.25
The Fourth Circuit relied on Mu'Min v. Pruett 6 to reject this claim. 27 The
claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claims in the
district court. Id. The court said that because Fisher failed to demonstrate that he was
prohibited from developing the factual basis for his claims in state court, he was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2). Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) (mandat-
ing that in a proceeding instituted by an application for writ of habeas corpus, if the applicant
has failed to develop the factual basis of a clain in State court proceedings, the court shall not
hold an evidentiary hearing unless the applicant shows that the claim relies on either a new
rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable or a factual predicate that could not
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and the facts underly-
ing the claim would be sufficient to establish that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense). The court also
found that the state court conducted a full evidentiary hearing, thus he had ample opportu-
nity to present his claims in state court. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 454.
22. Id. at 455; see S 15A-2000(e)(9).
23. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 455.
24. Id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
25. Id. at 455. Fisher pointed to North Carolina statutory provisions which required
the North Carolina Supreme Court (1) to consider the punishment imposed as well as any
errors assigned on appeal, and (2) to overturn a death sentence if the court determined that
the record did not support the jury findings of the aggravators, that sentence was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factor, or that the sentence of death
was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Id. at 456; see N.C.
GEN. STAT. 55 15A-2000 (d)(1), (d)(2) (1999). Thus, Fisher argued that the North Carolina
state court was statutorily required to review the substance of the constitutional challenge
to the (e)(9) aggravator and, thus, the review was not independent of federal law. Fisher, 215
F.3d at 456.
26. 125 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1997).
27. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 456; see Mu'Min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997)
(considering and rejecting a habeas applicant's constitutional claims during its mandatory
review of death sentence because the review procedures only require court to determine if
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court found that, like Virginia's mandatory review provision in Mu'Min,
North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000(d) imposes no require-
ment that the court search the record for errors not pursued on direct
appeal. 28 Thus, the court found that the North Carolina courts rejected
Fisher's challenge to the jury instruction on adequate state law grounds.29
The court rejected Fisher's claims that the statute did not constitute "inde-
pendent and adequate" state grounds, and that he had shown cause and
prejudice for the default.30 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Fisher was
unable to overcome the default."1
Virginia's mandatory review provision does not require the court to
find errors. Counsel must make sure to allege all errors in the state court
in order to avoid procedural default. Objections must be timely, raised on
direct appeal, rely on all possible grounds, and rely on the same set of facts
in order to be properly preserved for appeal in subsequent state and federal
proceedings.2
Next, Fisher urged that his counsel's failure to pursue a challenge to
the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" jury instruction on appeal constituted
ineffective assistance." The limiting instruction that was given included
specific definitions of heinous, atrocious, and cruel and was taken from the
North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions.' The Fourth Circuit found that
the death penalty was imposed under influence of improper considerations, and not to
examine the record for constitutional errors not specified on appeal).
28. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 456. Compare VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1996)
(requiring review of a death sentence to determine "whether it was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor") with N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-
2000(d) (1999) (requiring that the Supreme Court of North Carolina automatically review
a capital conviction and sentence of death and overturn a death sentence upon a finding that
the record does not support the jury's findings of any aggravating circumstance upon which
the sentencing court based its sentence of death, or upon a finding that the sentence was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, or upon a
finding that the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases).
29. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 456.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally Matthew K. Mahoney, Bridging the Procedral Default Chasm, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 305, 318 (2000) (suggesting method by which defense counsel can "make record" and
avoid procedural default).
33. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 456.
34. Id. at 457. The reader should note that the Fourth Circuit found the following
limiting instruction sufficient in this case:
The next issue is "the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
Now in this context lieinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.
Atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile and cruel means designed to inflict
a hi degree of pain with utter indifference to or even enjoyment of the suffer-
ing of otEers. However it is not enough that this murder be heinous, atrocious
or cruel as these terms iave just been defined. This murder must nave been
2000]
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the instruction had already been subjected to a vagueness challenge and
determined to provide constitutionally sufficient guidance to the jury.3"
Further, the court found that the limiting instruction emphasized that not
every murder is especially "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and that in order
to find this aggravator, the jury must conclude that any brutality involved
in the murder must have exceeded that which is normally present in the
crime. 6 In light of this, the court found that Fisher's counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise the constitutionality of the limiting instruc-
tion on direct appeal and that there was no sufficient probability that had
this been done, the result of the proceeding would have been different."7
Thus, there was no showing of cause or prejudice to support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The procedural default was affirmed.39
Christina S. Pignatelli
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and not every murder is especially so. For
murder to have been especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, any brutality
which was involved in it must have exceeed that which is normallypresent in
any .kiing or this murder must have been ... a conscienceless or ptiless crime
wich was unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
Id. at 458.
The Virginia Model Instructions do not define the three "vileness" factors. See VA.
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL Nos. 33.122, 33.125 (Lexis Law Publishing 1999).
In Virginia, because there is no model defining instruction, counsel should prepare and
proffer such instructions and preserve objections if the instructions are denied. See generally
Melissa A. Ray, Meaningful Guidance: Reforming Virginia'sModeljury Instructions on Vileness
and Future Dangerousness, 13 Cap. Def. J. 85 (2000) (suggesting reform to the Vir*inia Model
Jury Instructions Criminal and offering more detailed instructions on the vileness sub-
elements).
35. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 458; see State v. Syriani, 428 S.E.2d 118, 140-41 (N.C. 1993)
(rejecting the challenge because the jury instructions incorporated narrowing definitions
adopted by the state court and approved by the Supreme Court, and provided constitution-
ally sufficient guidance to the jury).
36. Fisher, 215 F.3d at 459.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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